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n INTRODUCTION
Avian Influenza (AI) is a highly contagious viral respiratory disease that affects all spe-
cies of birds, including commercial, wild, and pet 
While the world is focused on attending, controlling, 
and mitigating the current pandemic of COVID-19, 
caused by the SARS-CoV-2, other viral threats are pos-
sibly emerging and reemerging especially in Asia, pos-
ing a risk for the spread in that region and beyond. A 
predictable threat is the avian influenza virus, especially 
H5N6, which has recently led to significant outbreaks 
in China and the Philippines, deserving more attention 
and control. In the current review, we assess the histo-
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ry of this highly pathogenic reemerging virus, as well 
as the contemporary implications of poultry outbreaks 
occurring in some Asian countries. We also look at out-
breaks due to other strains not only in Asia but also 
across Europe and Africa, according to recent reports 
from the World Organization of Animal Health (OIE).
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birds [1-3]. Its causal agent, the Avian influenza 
virus (AIV) is a single-stranded segmented neg-
ative-sense RNA virus. Classification is based on 
the antigenic properties of their Hemagglutinin 
(HA) and Neuraminidase (NA) [4, 5]. According 
to the ability of the virus to cause significant dis-
ease, the different strains could be further divided 
into Non-Pathogenic AIV (NPAIV), Low-Patho-
genic AIV (LPAIV), and Highly-pathogenic AIV 
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(HPAIV) [6]. Spillover to human beings and other 
animal species may occur, leading to an infection 
that may be life-threatening [1].
Throughout history, most AIV did not infect hu-
mans. However, sporadic cross-species infections 
did occur, triggering mild outbreaks, and even 
pandemics (Spanish flu, 1918-1920 caused by 
H1N1) [7]. From 2010 to date, over 400 cases and 
more than 150 human deaths by an HPAI have 
been reported in Egypt, Ghana, Hong Kong, Indo-
nesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and Canada [8, 9]. The threat of a new HPAI strain 
has been latent over the years, with occasional 
outbreaks in poultry associated with severe con-
sequences on livelihoods, international trade, and 
also severely impacting public health systems [2, 
10]. Recently, lineages of the H5Nx (H5N1, H5N2, 
H5N6, H5N8) have proven to pose a severe risk 
to the veterinarian and human health due to the 
capacity for the zoonotic spread and the genomic 
interactions amongst this viral group (Figure 1) 
[11]. One example was the 2003 H5N1 epidemic, 
spreading from Asia to Europe and Africa, caus-
ing millions of animal deaths and hundreds of 
people infected, with reported case fatality rate 
close to 60% [2, 12].
The AIV H5N6 was an LPAIV first reported dec-
ades ago [11]. However, the first reported case of 
human infection with a novel HPAIV H5N6 dates 
from 2014 in China, with symptoms that includ-
ed fever and sore throat [4, 12, 13]. The associa-
tion with live bird markets (LBM) or wet markets 
was established, confirming once more the threat 
that these markets pose to public health as they 
provide a perfect scenario for the spread, but also 
the modification of the AIV genes due to the close 
Figure 1 - Origin of H5N6 and other Avian Influenza viruses.
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contact among birds and humans, and low or 
non-existent biosecurity measures [6, 14, 15]. By 
December 2018, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) reported a total of 23 human infections 
due to the H5N6 influenza virus, with 15 deaths 
[16]. This year, outbreaks have been recorded in 
the Philippines, Nigeria, Vietnam, and China, af-
fecting only animals. Nevertheless, the risk for 
zoonotic spread and spillover has been well doc-
umented, with continuous evolution causing sig-
nificant concern within the medical community 
due to the latent risk for a pandemic [17].
Under the current circumstances of public health 
emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we 
must remain alert of the persistent threats that 
emerging infectious diseases signify to us daily. 
This article aims to perform a narrative review of 
the literature available about the H5N6 virus and 
raise awareness in the readership about the po-
tential risk of H5N6 Influenza as the next proba-
ble public health emergency of international con-
cern (PHEIC).
n PREVIOUS SCENARIO
Currently, avian influenza outbreaks remain a 
global public health problem, with several sub-
types of the H5Nx virus (H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, 
H5N8, among other) in circulation and continu-
ally threatening animal and even human health. 
Their zoonotic nature and the capacity for genom-
ic interactions within this viral group gives rise 
to new variants whose pathogenicity in mammals 
and humans remains yet poorly understood [11]. 
Human-infection with the H5N1 subtype was 
first diagnosed in Hong Kong in 1997. Since then, 
it reemerged in 2003 and 2004, spreading from 
Asia to Europe and Africa, causing hundreds of 
human cases and deaths, as well as the slaugh-
ter of hundreds of millions of poultry who were 
implicated as host [18]. Now in 2020, a new out-
break of this virus has been reported in China, 
once again claiming thousands of animals’ lives, 
for the time being without affecting humans. 
Globally, since 2014 avian influenza has been 
identified in 77 countries, involving up to 13 dif-
ferent strains of AIV that have caused the death of 
millions of domestic and wild birds. During the 
first quarter of 2020, outbreaks of AIV H5N6 have 
been reported in countries such as the Philippines, 
Nigeria, Vietnam, and China, with available noti-
fied cases from the latter three to the World Or-
ganization for Animal Health (OIE) adding up to 
8,781 affected birds, of which 8,331 died of illness 
[19]. An estimated 26,817 birds slaughtered to 
prevent the spread of the virus [2].
AIV H5N6 subtype represents a persistent threat 
due to its continuous evolution, evidenced in re-
petitive outbreaks in live birds’ markets; spillo-
ver to wild bird populations that guarantees its 
spread during bird migration; and the latent risk 
of triggering an event of pandemic proportions 
in humans. An AIV H5N6 outbreaks would be 
of high impact. The handling and direct contact 
with infected birds, as in previous outbreaks, 
would BE the primary risk factor [6, 11, 17, 20]. 
Although it is impossible to continually monitor 
and establish the location of all subtypes of this 
Influenza, making it difficult to assess its threat 
to humans, it is necessary to define those groups 
of local and regional genotypes that circulate in 
each host as well as to carry out a genetic surveil-
lance approach to better understand their trans-
missibility, pathogenicity and possible spill-overs 
between species [11]. That will make it possible 
to integrate a risk-based strategy that considers 
migratory patterns, the complex and dynamic na-
ture of animals, and to understand the underlying 
socio-economic factors influencing human behav-
ior [13].
n THE VIRUS 
Influenza viruses, as enveloped RNA viruses 
with a segmented genome, display great antigen-
ic diversity. Influenza A and B viruses have two 
major antigenic surface glycoproteins embedded 
into the membrane, which are the HA (a surface 
glycoprotein that binds to sialic acid residues in 
the respiratory epithelium, necessary for the on-
set of infection) and the NA that induce antibody 
responses in humans. In contrast to subtypes B 
and C, type A virus can exhibit more significant 
variability in those glycoproteins allowing a full 
differential virulence amongst each other, thus 
affecting mainly different population groups. For 
example, subtype C has been reported to com-
monly cause respiratory illness in children, with 
subtype B being the one with a lesser propensity 
for antigenic changes [21]. Antigenic shift is the 
main feature of these viruses than can lead to re-
assortment among viruses co-infecting the same 
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cell based on the nature of its segmented genome, 
which may explain the pandemics of 1957, 1968, 
and 2009 [22]. Nevertheless, the segmented ge-
nome alone is not responsible for the antigenic 
shift, as the genome of Influenza B is also seg-
mented, an antigenic shift occurs due to reassort-
ment of genes between avian and human or other 
animal viruses like swine. The pandemics of 1957, 
1968, and 2009 were caused by reassortment of 
genes leading to antigenic shift.
Avian influenza virus (AIV) is a single-stranded 
segmented negative-sense RNA virus, member of 
the Orthomyxoviridae family, Influenza virus A/
Alpha-influenza-virus genus [4, 23]. Its external 
glycoproteins HA and NA define the subtypes: 
18 HA (H1-H18), and 11 NA (N1-N11) are known 
[4]. The HA gene of AIV has changed, giving rise 
to reassorted subtypes, clades, and genes [23, 24]. 
According to different pathotypes, AIV leads to 
different infection outcomes and organic commit-
ment, which allows to divide them into NPAIV, 
LPAIV, and HPAIV. In birds, LPAIVs can cause 
mild respiratory or gastrointestinal infection, and 
HPAIVs can induce multi-organ infection along 
with high morbidity and mortality [6]. Although 
the H5 HA genes of these viruses are closely re-
lated, the subtypes of their NA genes vary wide-
ly, making them the “H5Nx” viruses [11, 13, 25]. 
Since their emergence in China in 2010, subtypes 
H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, and H5N8 that are HPAIV 
have threatened global bird species as well as hu-
mans [23, 25-27]. They are classified into the clade 
2.3.4.4, and phylogenetic analysis of available se-
quences suggests that they first appeared in West-
ern Russia. However, the long-distance migratory 
pattern of wild birds later spread them into West-
ern Europe and Asia [16, 17, 28].
The clade 2.3.4.4 is prevalent in Asia and South-
East Asia, with the most pervasive NA subtypes 
being H5N6 AIV, the most harmful and the most 
widespread of all. This clade initially found 
in China has since spread to Laos and Vietnam 
in 2014-2015, as evidenced in recent outbreaks 
among poultry [6,26,29]. The H5N6 virus has a 
glutamine residue at position 226, and a glycine 
residue at position 228, suggestive of preferential 
binding to sialic acid receptors joined to sugar 
chains through an α-2,3 linkage; plus, an addition-
al single amino acid deletion (133 sites of HA1) 
relative to the other clade 2.3.4.4 HA genes (ex, 
MDk/Korea/W452/14). The deletion at this po-
sition alters the 3D structure of the receptor-bind-
ing unit, causing an alteration of the HA recep-
tor-binding specificity resulting in an increased 
affinity for the α-2,6 linkage [29]. The H5N6 pos-
sess multiple basic amino acids at the HA cleav-
age site resulting highly pathogenic in chickens 
and with distinct evolutionary characteristics like 
its presumed capacity to bind to the α2, 6-linked 
receptor; and mutations in the HA protein such as 
the P128, A138, and A160 and an 11-aa deletion in 
the NA stalk, which may enhance their adapta-
tion and potential infection in mammals, giving 
this virus a considerable zoonotic potential [6, 16, 
17, 20, 29]. Also, the HPAIV harboring the H5 HA 
genes of clade 2.3.4.4 appeared to circulate more 
efficiently in migratory birds than the HPAIVs 
belonging to the other H5 genetic clades; which 
during 2016-2017 winter season H5N6 caused 
outbreaks in wild birds and poultry across Eu-
rope and East Asian countries, including China, 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan [17, 27, 30, 31]. 
There is a capability of AIVs heading to terrible 
population losses if a different AIV appear with 
the capacity of persistent transmission from hu-
man to human [1].
n ASSOCIATED VIRUSES
HPAIV is a continual threat to animal and hu-
man health, causing infections and deaths not 
only in countless birds but also in humans. H5 
subtypes like H5N1, which is derived from the 
H6N1 (an NPAIV), infected 18 people in 1997 in 
Hong Kong, six of whom died from the infection. 
Furthermore, since 2003, H5N1 has caused out-
breaks both in birds and humans in more than 
60 countries. Recently, subtypes H5N1, H5N2, 
H5N5, H5N6, and H5N8 have also been linked to 
poultry outbreaks in China, as well as in South 
Korea (subtype H5N8), Japan (subtype H5N8), 
Laos (subtype H5N8), Vietnam (subtypes H5N1 
and H5N6), and USA (subtype H5N8). In all, ad-
equate control of the epizootic was achieved by 
culling over millions of birds [6, 13].
H5N6 joined H5N1 as the only subtypes among 
the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses known to cause human 
infections [13]. It was first detected in Changsha, 
China; on February of 2014; and since then has 
continued to reassort with other AIV subtypes, 
deriving in 34 genotypes and four main geno-
types: A (internal genes of H5N1-origin), B (PB2 
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of H6-origin, and others of H5N1-origin), C (in-
ternal genes of H9-origin), and D (PB2 of H6-ori-
gin and PB1of H3-origin, and others of H5N1); be-
ing the latter the currently dominant gene type [4, 
16, 26, 28, 32-34]. As of December 2018, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has reported 23 hu-
man infections with the H5N6 virus, which result-
ed in 15 deaths [16]. Previous studies have shown 
that H5N6 viruses isolated from the patients had 
a very close genetic relationship (HA gene ∼95% 
nucleotide sequence identity) with H5N6 viruses 
isolated from the live poultry market, suggest-
ing an equivalent zoonotic infection risk [13, 20]. 
Hence, the H5N6 virus became a severe threat to 
the poultry industry as to human health [16].
Nevertheless, AIV H5N6 has not yet exhibit-
ed transmissibility from person to person due 
to a lack of mutations Q226L and G228S in the 
HA protein, which is known to increase affinity 
for the glycan-receptors in the lower respiratory 
tracts of humans [4]. Notwithstanding, the H5N6 
virus was later detected in 2017-2018 in wild birds 
across several European countries, including the 
Netherlands, where there were three commercial 
poultry farms and two affected hobby holdings. 
This virus was a novel reassortant of the H5N8 
clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses, which were first de-
tected at the Russia-Mongolia border in May 2016. 
This virus was also distinct from the zoonotic 
Asian H5N6 strains that caused infections in hu-
mans, and there are currently no reported human 
cases associated with this novel H5N6 reassortant 
[35]. One main concern for public health agencies, 
when confronted with a new AIV subtype, is to 
define the risk of a pandemic arrival. H5N6 and 
other zoonotic influenza viruses should be kept in 
mind in the immediate future [1].
n OUTBREAK OF AVIAN INFLUENZA - 2003 
During 2003, avian Influenza played a threaten-
ing role for public health again. At the end of the 
year, several countries notified the simultaneous 
epidemics of HPAIV H5N1 with devastating re-
sults for animal health. In that year, 204,682 cases 
of AIV were reported to OIE throughout this year 
from countries such as Germany, Belgium, Korea, 
Hong Kong, Holland, and Vietnam, which led to 
the death of approximately 18,648 birds and the 
slaughter of over 30 million animals for the con-
trol of the disease [2]. Unfortunately, throughout 
this period, human health was affected simulta-
neously by an HPAIV H7N7 outbreak that caused 
89 human cases in the Netherlands, mostly mild 
symptomatic and with one reported death, a vet-
erinarian with confirmed close contact to infected 
birds, highlighting the zoonotic potential of this 
virus [36].
n THE DISEASE
HPAIV produces one of the most devastating in-
fectious diseases in the world. Its infections usu-
ally cause a highly contagious systemic disease 
with significant morbidity and mortality amongst 
susceptible populations. The disease presentation 
encompasses a broad spectrum of clinical signs 
and symptoms, including diarrhea, sneezing, un-
explained emaciation, discharge from the mouth, 
nose, ears or vent; extensive swelling, abnormal 
feathers, behavioral abnormalities, locomotion 
abnormalities, and mass mortality (unexpected 
mortality considering the natural history of the 
species) [37].
Waterfowl and shorebirds are considered to be 
the natural reservoirs for all AIV sub-types, which 
most of them are NPAIV or LPAIV; however, AIV 
underwent a further combination of genetic drifts 
and shifts that resulted in the production of HPAIV 
as the H5 clade 2.3.4.4 [37]. An example of this is 
the enzootic H5N1 that reemerged in 2003 and re-
mained to date as a cause of outbreaks in poultry 
throughout Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, 
after being disseminated along flyways by migra-
tory birds [13, 28]. Since 2010 AIV with different 
NA subtypes also have been detected, including 
H5N2, H5N3, H5N6, and H5N8 [13]. Wild birds’ 
migration acts out as a risk factor for the first in-
troduction, the genetic information obtained out 
of virus outbreaks in Korea, Europe, Canada, and 
the USA, suggested the involvement of them in 
the spread of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 over long distances. 
However, they may not be the hosts to support 
secondary spread along with poultry [13]. The 
worldwide co-circulation of LPAIV and HPAIV, 
comprised a fixed “gene pool,” before 2010 with 
no evidence of reassortment of the H5N1 viruses 
with NA subtypes other than N1. However, since 
2010 influenza A viruses with different NA sub-
types have been detected in wild birds and poul-
try in China, including H5N2, H5N3, H5N6, and 
H5N8 [13]. Although not yet reaching pandemic 
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proportions, these recurring AIV outbreaks pose a 
persistent threat throughout the world [11].
Live birds’ markets pose a real threat to public 
health since AIV is more frequently detected in 
them than in farms, making an ideal environment 
for genetic reassortment events and interspecies 
transmission [38]. As an example, Vietnam has an 
approximately 308 million population of poultry; 
almost 80% of them are raised under conditions 
without biosecurity applications [15]. Case-con-
trol studies have established risk factors for an 
outbreak, such as “in-house” poultry slaughter-
ing, having a greater variety of species (i.e., sell-
ing ducks alongside other species), visitors, and 
open water sources [15, 39]. That means that ge-
netically diverse populations of the virus are dis-
tributed in discrete parts of the poultry trade net-
work, so even intermediaries and more than one 
retailer can play an essential role as risk factors 
in the spread and modification of AIV genes [15]. 
Live birds’ markets provide sufficient opportuni-
ties for close contact among waterfowl, domestic 
poultry, mammals (even humans), which in turn 
results in the emergence of novel AIV [6, 14].
H5N6 ended up as an HPAIV after being around 
in live birds’ markets [40]. This subtype was an 
LPAIV noted in the past in Wisconsin, USA (1975), 
Germany (1984), and California, USA (2013), but 
had little impact until now [11]. Since 2014 it 
joined as the latest addition to emerging zoonotic 
avian influenza threats in East and Southeast Asia 
[40]. As another enzootic HPAIV has noticeable 
clinical signs during its outbreaks, as seen in sev-
eral swans in the Fleet Lagoon in December 2017 
in Japan with compulsively spinning on the wa-
ter, lethargic or very poor coordinated, and in the 
following months some of them even presented 
abnormally twisted necks. During this epidemic, 
61 swans died [41]. Also, dead-bird surveillance 
has enabled us to learn more about pathologic 
manifestations of wild birds affected by HPAIV 
H5N6, which showed hepatic and pancreatic ne-
crosis, intestinal hemorrhage, and although not 
apparent, gross lesions in the brain, kidney, and 
spleen in some subjects [26].
High levels of AIV endemicity exposes the naïve 
immunological system of humans to its antigens, 
turning out to sporadic cases reported each year 
and sustaining the ongoing threat of pandemic 
emergence [15]. Despite the absence of data of 
when and how the AIV leaped to humans, the 
whole gene sequences of cases show the consist-
ency with the evolution of H5N6 isolated from 
live birds’ markets, suggesting the infection 
might originate in this environment [6, 42]. Like-
wise, it is known that the direct contact with feces 
of the sick animal or its corpses, favors the spread 
of the human-infecting virus [29]. Like live birds’ 
markets act as deemed potential hotbeds for in-
fection, the first human infection with AIV H5N6 
happened in Changsha, China, in February 2014. 
A girl aged five and a half years was exposed to 
the market trading site for about 5 minutes a day 
for four days and after an incubation period of 
2-5 days sought medical attention due to influen-
za-like illness including fever (38.9°C) and sore 
throat, her blood showed 23.12×109/L white 
blood cells, twice the upper bound of the nor-
mal range; neutrophils higher than the normal 
range, and lymphocytes lower than the normal 
range, after a diagnosis of suppurative tonsillitis 
she was sent home with a combination of amox-
icillin and clavulanate potassium, ibuprofen sus-
pension and herb medicine. After three days, her 
symptoms did not improve. Chills appeared, so 
throat swab samples were collected on day sev-
en and day 11 respectively which tested posi-
tive for H5 but negative for N1 using real-time 
PCR, the phylogenetic analyses revealed that 
the HA gene of A/Changsha/1/2014(H5N6) 
was closely related to A/duck/Sichuan/NCX-
N11/2014(H5N1) virus (98% identity). The NA 
gene was closely associated with A/chicken/
Jiangxi/12782/2014(H10N6) virus (99% identi-
ty), demonstrating the infection with the triple 
reassortant subtype H5N6; then, she recovered 
quickly after Tamiflu therapy [4, 13].
After the first reported human case in 2014, an-
other three cases of AIV H5N6 presented in adults 
during that same year, one of them died; in all 
of them, previous exposure to poultry was con-
firmed or likely [4, 13]. A later series of ten cases 
emerged after December 2015, a sharp increase in 
frequency [42]. Throughout the next three years, 
by December 2018, there was an overtime total of 
23 human infections reported by the WHO, with 
15 of them resulting in death, with no evidence 
of human-to-human transmission of AIV H5N6 
among the close contacts [13, 16]. Until March 16, 
2020, the WHO had not received reports of new 
cases of human infection with H5N6 to date [43]. 
Even though from the H5 clade 2.3.4.4, H5N6 and 
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H5N1 are the only ones with human infections re-
ported nowadays, there is evidence from sera of 
people exposed to infected or dead birds during 
outbreaks in Russia that tested positive for anti-
bodies to AIV H5N8 [44].
This disease has gone from being an exclusive avi-
an disease to one that affects other mammals with 
potential zoonotic spread, and sadly it remains 
outside of epidemiological statistics worldwide 
[45]. There is a need to base a One Health ap-
proach that works effectively so the human health 
sector, with qualified program staff; will control 
and prevent this zoonosis through programs that 
include active and passive surveillance, early re-
porting and response, the slaughter of poultry in 
infected farms and use of mass or targeted vacci-
nation [13, 46].
n CURRENT SCENARIO - OCCURRENCE  
OF H5N6 AVIAN INFLUENZA DURING  
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC TIME
It is essential to mention that to date, multiple 
outbreaks of H5N6 avian Influenza have been re-
ported so far in 2020. The care protocols for these 
outbreaks have caused poultry to be sacrificed to 
contain the disease, which so far has resulted in 
more than 15,000 poultry being culled or dying 
from the epidemic in countries such as the Phil-
ippines [47].
The epidemiology of AI is complex. AI viruses 
constantly evolve by mutation and reassortment 
with the emergence of new subtypes, causing a 
significant impact on animal health and produc-
tion. Some AI subtypes can be zoonotic, as occurs 
with H5N6, and therefore pose a considerable 
threat to human health [47].
If we look into the last four reports of the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), from Jan-
uary 1 to March 26, 2020, the situation would 
be considering worrying [47]. Over this period, 
when the pandemic of COVID-19 originated and 
increased, in three continents, Asia, Europe, Afri-
ca, there have been 18 countries affected with 153 
outbreaks of H5N6, H5N1, H5N2, H5N8, in poul-
try and non-poultry, 98 (64%) in Asia, leading to 
the losses of 1,589,203 animals, notified in the on-
going and new outbreaks (Table 1). According to 
the OIE, the impact of the disease is measured in 
terms of losses, which are calculated by the sum 
of dead and culled animals from the infected farm 
or backyard premises of the reported outbreak. In 
the case of non-poultry, the losses correspond to 
the dead animals reported [48, 49].
Since 2014 (as of February 15, 2020), there were 24 
human cases of avian influenza A (H5N6) report-
ed globally, and all occurred in mainland China. 
The latest case was reported [on August 19, 2019] 
[50,51]. Recently, in three countries of Asia, and 
one of Africa, five human cases of avian Influenza 
A H9N2 infections reported in the past six months, 
in the provinces of Fujian and Anhui, China; at 
the Melghat District of Maharashtra State, India; 
Hong Kong; and Senegal, all occurring in people 
<18 years old [52]. 
Slaughtering must be done according to strict 
protocols provided by entities such as the OIE in 
their efforts to contain the virus locally and that 
there is no spread to other contiguous farms and, 
subsequently, globally, with all the implications 
in terms of economy and public health that this 
entails [47]. 
In recent decades, multiple subtypes (i.e., H9N2, 
H5N1, and H7N9) of AIV have become wide-
spread in China, causing enormous economic 
losses and posing considerable threats to the 
public health. This represents a challenge and the 
need for global insights into control strategies 
and guidelines for the prevention of AIV spread 
in China and globally in the immediate future 
[53]. Multiple reasons may explain why AIV has 
persisted in China, such as the socio-economic 
features, including poultry biosecurity, live bird 
markets, live bird transportation, wild birds, 
poultry waterfowl, poultry density, poultry pop-
ulation, and infected birds. Given this complex 
scenario, more research, enhanced surveillance, 
including genomic epidemiology, is necessary 
on AIV subtypes H9, H5 and H7 in China and 
neighbor countries, to elucidate the effectiveness 
of the strategies currently employed in China 
(i.e., culling, mass vaccination and biosecurity 
improvement) to control the disease, as well to 
provide a close vision on the future epidemio-
logical scenario. Recently, an outbreak report of 
H7N3 on April 2020 in the United States was in-
formed by the OIE, at a commercial meat-type 
turkey flock in a farm in Chesterfield County, 
South Carolina, including 34,160 susceptible 
animals, with 1,583 deaths (4.63%), with 32,577 
killed and disposal. Clinical signs included res-
piratory signs, snicking, and increased mortali-
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ty. State officials have quarantined the affected 
premises, and depopulation of birds has been 
completed. Movement controls have also been 
implemented. This was the first confirmed case 
of HPAI in commercial poultry in the United 
States in 2020 [54].
Table 1 - HPAI outbreaks reported through early warning system, from January 1 to March 26, 2020, summarized 
from the OIE reports [47].




Subtype(s) Number of Outbreaks  Global 
animal 
lossesPoultry Non-poultry Poultry Non-poultry
March 6 
to 26, 2020
Asia Chinese Taipei, 
Philippines




NA 6 NA 143,125
Africa South Africa 1 1 H5N8 NA 1 NA
  Europe Germany, Hungary, 
Poland
3 7 H5N8 H5N8 8 2
February 14 
to March 5, 
2020
Asia Chinese Taipei, 
India, Vietnam




NA 37 NA 440,095
  Europe Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland
3 7 H5N8 NA 13 NA
January 25 to 
February 14, 
2020
Asia China (People’s 
Rep. of), Chinese 
Taipei, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Vietnam





H5N8 30 1 587,029
  Europe Germany, Poland, 
Slovakia




Africa South Africa 1 1 H5N8 NA 2 0 418,954
Asia China (People’s 
Rep. of), Chinese 
Taipei, India








7 12 H5N8 H5N8 24 2
January 1 to March 26, 2020
Subtotals
 
Africa South Africa 1       3 0  
Asia Chinese Taipei, 
Philippines, India, 
Vietnam, China 
(People’s Rep. of), 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Vietnam, India
9 98 4





8       52 4
Total     18       153 8 1,589,203
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n CONCLUSIONS
The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guang-
dong/1/96-lineage highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have occurred in mul-
tiple waves since 1996. From 2013 onwards, clade 
2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), 
and A(H5N8) emerged to cause panzootic waves 
of unprecedented magnitude among avian spe-
cies accompanied by severe losses to the poultry 
industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) vi-
ruses have expanded in distinct geographical and 
evolutionary pathways likely via long-distance 
migratory bird dispersal onto several continents 
and by poultry trade among neighboring coun-
tries. Coupled with regional circulation, the virus-
es have evolved further by reassorting with local 
viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 
cases of humans infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 
viruses, 16 (70%) of whom had fatal outcomes. To 
date, no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable 
human-to-human transmission. However, due 
to the lack of population immunity in humans 
and the ongoing evolution of the virus, there is 
a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) virus-
es could cause an influenza pandemic if these vi-
ruses should transmit efficiently among humans. 
Therefore, multisectoral collaborations among 
the veterinary, environmental, and public health 
sectors are essential to conduct risk assessments 
and develop countermeasures to prevent disease 
and to control spread [55]. The increased human 
interaction, the lack of adequate controls, and 
the significant international travel rate may pose 
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